Abstract. This paper examines the impact of group purchasing organizations (GPOs) on healthcare-8 product supply chains. The supply chain we examine consists of a profit-maximizing manufacturer with a 9 quantity-discount schedule that is nonincreasing in quantity and ensures nondecreasing revenue, a profit- 
implications for government policy and, in practical terms, for the cost of healthcare.
Based on these observations, we believe these results on equilibria can be generalized (see §7). of the differences in healthcare providers' purchasing requirements. In contrast to Hu and Schwarz (2011) where the GPO is formed by the providers, here the GPO is an independent entity that 176 negotiates contracts for the providers by charging membership fees and CAFs, thereby possibly 177 making a profit. Hence, to the best of our knowledge, our model captures important features that 178 have not been examined in the current healthcare supply chain literature.
179
One strand of economics literature examines the impact on competition among manufacturers 180 when buyers form a GPO to commit to purchasing exclusively from only one of the manufacturers.
181
This strand of research does not address the features of healthcare supply chains that are identified 182 in the introduction, such as CAFs and the price inelasticity of the buyers' demands, nor is the Table 1 : Summary of parameters q i provider i's fixed purchasing requirement, for i = 1, . . . , n p the competitive source's fixed unit pricê f G GPO membership feẽ f G each provider's fixed contracting cost when purchasing through the GPO f G =f G +f G f M each provider's fixed contracting cost when purchasing from the manufacturer or competitive source λ CAF (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) Table 2 : Summary of decision variables u i 1 if provider i purchases through the GPO, and 0 otherwise v i 1 if provider i purchases from the manufacturer, and 0 otherwise w i 1 if provider i purchases from the competitive source, and 0 otherwise x i quantity purchased by provider i through the GPO y i quantity purchased by provider i from the manufacturer z i quantity purchased by provider i from the competitive source p G GPO's per-unit on-contract price p(·) manufacturer's quantity-discount schedule:
for a quantity q, the manufacturer offers a price of p(q)
that is, q 1 ≤ q 2 ≤ · · · ≤ q n . In addition, we assume f G ≤ f M : the providers' fixed contracting cost 234 is lower through the GPO. We denote ∆f = f M − f G ≥ 0 the GPO's contracting efficiency.
235
We formally describe the game by defining the optimization problem for each player. For each 236 i = 1, . . . , n, provider i's problem is to minimize the total cost of purchasing q i (a) through the 237 GPO, (b) directly from the manufacturer, and (c) from the competitive source:
s.t. x i + y i + z i = q i , x i ≤ q i u i , y i ≤ q i v i , z i ≤ q i w i , u i ∈ {0, 1}, v i ∈ {0, 1}, w i ∈ {0, 1}, x i ≥ 0, y i ≥ 0, z i ≥ 0.
(3.1)
The GPO's problem is to choose the unit on-contract price that maximizes its profit:
The GPO's revenue consists of (a) membership fees and (b) on-contract sales, and the cost (c) it 240 incurs is its provider-members' combined purchasing cost from the manufacturer, discounted by the 241 CAF.
Finally, the manufacturer's problem is to choose a quantity-discount schedule that maximizes its 243 revenue (i.e., profit):
s.t. p(q) is nonincreasing in q, p(q)q is nondecreasing in q.
(3.
2)
The manufacturer's revenue is derived from sales: (a) through the GPO, discounted by the CAF,
245
or (b) directly to the providers. We assume that the manufacturer's choice of quantity-discount 246 schedule p(q) is constrained so that it is nonincreasing in the quantity q, and the associated 247 revenue p(q)q is nondecreasing in q. In addition, we assume that when a provider can purchase 248 its requirement at the same total purchasing cost from each of its three options, its preference is 249 first, to buy through the GPO, second, to purchase directly from the manufacturer, and third, to 250 purchase from the competitive source. 
Without a GPO

252
The non-cooperative game without a GPO is very similar. There are n + 1 players: the manufacturer 253 and the n providers. The competitive source remains exogenous with the same unit price. The 254 sequence of events are similar to those in §3.1, except that the GPO is absent.
255
For each i = 1, . . . , n, provider i's problem is to minimize its total purchasing cost:
s.t. y i + z i = q i , y i ≤ q i v i , z i ≤ q i w i , v i ∈ {0, 1}, w i ∈ {0, 1}, y i ≥ 0, z i ≥ 0.
The manufacturer's problem is still to choose a quantity-discount schedule that maximizes its 257 revenue:
p(y i )y i s.t. p(q) is nonincreasing in q, p(q)q is nondecreasing in q.
Note that both games described in this section assume that the manufacturer's production cost 259 is zero, but can be easily extended to include this cost. By reinterpreting p(q) as the manufacturer's 260 unit profit function in the quantity q, including the manufacturer's production cost does not affect 261 our analysis, as long as the manufacturer's marginal profit is nonincreasing, and its total profit is 262 nondecreasing in quantity. This holds given our assumptions on the quantity-discount schedule, for example, when the manufacturer's production cost is linear in quantity.
264
In the next section, we use backward induction to reveal the structure of equilibrium strategies 265 for these games.
266
4 The structure of equilibrium strategies 267
With a GPO
268
The following lemma states that in an SPNE, each provider, in choosing the option with the lowest 269 total purchasing cost, purchases its entire requirement either (a) from the GPO, (b) directly from 270 the manufacturer, or (c) from the competitive source. Let s i represent provider i's sourcing strategy,
271
and let "GPO," "mfr," and "comp" represent these respective sourcing options.
272
Lemma 4.1. Let p(·) and p G be any given strategies for the manufacturer and the GPO, respectively.
273
Then, for i = 1, . . . , n:
is an optimal strategy for provider i;
277
(i.e. s i = mfr) is an optimal strategy for provider i; 278 c. ifp+
is an optimal strategy for provider i.
280
We define the break-even price p B k of provider k ∈ {1, . . . , n} as the price at which provider k is 281 indifferent between purchasing through the GPO and the less costly of its other two direct purchasing 282 options; that is,
Let π B k be the GPO's profit at break-even price p B k : that is,
For notational convenience, we define p B 0 = +∞ and π B 0 = 0: this price and corresponding profit 285 captures the possibility that the GPO can set its price sufficiently high so that all providers find it 286 cheaper to purchase directly from the manufacturer or the competitive source.
287
Using Lemma 4.1, we can characterize the optimal strategies of the providers and the GPO as a function of the manufacturer's quantity-discount schedule. Note that since p is nonincreasing in 289 q and q 1 ≤ · · · ≤ q n , there exists such that p(q i ) >p for all i = 1, . . . , , and p(q i ) ≤p for all 290 i = + 1, . . . , n.
291
Lemma 4.2. Let p(·) be any given strategy for the manufacturer. Let be such that p(q i ) >p for 292 all i = 1, . . . , , and p(q i ) ≤p for all i = + 1, . . . , n.
293
a. The strategy p G = p B k is optimal for the GPO, where k = arg max k=0,1,...,n π B k , with associated
is an optimal strategy for the GPO, for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Then the 296 provider i's optimal strategy is 297 s i = GPO for i = 1, . . . , k ; comp for i = k + 1, . . . , ; mfr for i = + 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 4.2 states that in equilibrium, it is optimal for the GPO to set its unit on-contract price 298 to a break-even price. In addition, if it is optimal for a provider to purchase through the GPO
299
(manufacturer) in equilibrium, then it is optimal for all providers with smaller (larger) purchasing 300 requirements to also purchase through the GPO (manufacturer). Intuitively, because each provider's 301 demand is fixed and known, the manufacturer and the GPO offer prices to extract as much profit as 302 possible from providers, whose tradeoff is between a lower unit price (either from the competitive 303 sourcep, from the GPO, or directly from the manufacturer) and the fixed saving from contract 304 efficiency. As a result, if a provider purchases through the GPO, all the smaller providers will do so 305 as well. The manufacturer's equilibrium strategy is as follows.
306
Lemma 4.3. Define k (p) so that the break-even price p B k (p) is an optimal strategy for the GPO-i.e.,
307
as defined in Lemma 4.2a-when the manufacturer's quantity-discount schedule is p. In addition, for 308 any quantity-discount schedule p, define (p) so that p(q i ) >p for all i = 1, . . . , (p), and p(q i ) ≤p
309
for all i = (p) + 1, . . . , n. Then, the manufacturer's optimal strategy is 310 arg max
Using Lemmas 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 with an exhaustive search through all the manufacturer's feasible quantity-discount schedules, we can compute an SPNE of this game. Suppose P is a finite set 312 of feasible quantity-discount schedules that contains the manufacturer's optimal strategy (4.3).
313
Depending on the nature of the quantity-discount schedule, this can be achieved by discretizing 314 the space of quantity-discount schedules sufficiently fine. How this can be done for particular 315 quantity-discount schedules is discussed in §7. The procedure in Figure 1 computes an SPNE
316
(s , p G , p ).
317
π M ← +∞ for all p ∈ P do Find such that p(q i ) >p for i = 1, . . . , , and p(q i ) ≤p for i = + 1, . . . , n. 
Without a GPO
318
As in the game with a GPO, we can show that in equilibrium, each provider purchases its entire 319 requirement either (a) from the manufacturer, or (b) from the competitive source, choosing the 320 least costly. In addition, if it is optimal for a provider to purchase through the manufacturer in 321 equilibrium, then it is optimal for all providers with larger purchasing requirements to also purchase 322 through the manufacturer. b. v i = 1, y i = q i , w i = 0, z i = 0 (i.e. s i = mfr) is an optimal strategy for providers i = + 1, . . . , n.
327
Based on Lemma 4.4, we obtain the following characterization of the manufacturer's equilibrium 328 strategy.
329
Lemma 4.5. For any quantity-discount schedule p, define (p) so that p(q i ) >p for all i = 330 1, . . . , (p), and p(q i ) ≤p for all i = (p) + 1, . . . , n. Then, the manufacturer's optimal strategy is 331 arg max
In a similar fashion to the game with a GPO, Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 together with an exhaustive 332 search of the manufacturer's feasible quantity-discount schedules imply a procedure for computing a 333 subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, similar to the one in Figure 1 .
334
In the next two sections, we use these structural insights to fully characterize the equilibrium 335 behavior for two special cases, both with a linear quantity-discount schedule: two providers with 336 different purchasing requirements and n providers with identical purchasing requirements. We will 337 then return our attention to more general cases and identify insights from these special cases that 338 appear to apply more generally.
339
5 The case of two heterogeneous providers and linear quantity discount
340
In this section, we focus on the special case with two heterogeneous providers. We assume that the 341 manufacturer offers a linear quantity-discount schedule p(·) of the form as we shall see in §7, these characterizations appear to apply in the case of nonlinear quantity-discount 349 schedules as well.
350
In the game with a GPO, the manufacturer's optimization problem (3.2) can be rewritten as
where γ max = p * /(2 n i=1 q i ). The manufacturer's choice of discount rate γ is constrained between 352 0 and γ max so that its revenue p(q)q as a function of the quantity q is nondecreasing on [0,
353
We also assume thatp ≥ p 
The different SPNE of this game can be categorized according to the level of the GPO's 363 contracting efficiency. We say that the GPO's contracting efficiency is "low" if ∆f ∈ [0, ∆f (1) ],
364
"moderate" if (∆f (1) , ∆f (2) ], and "high" if ∆f ∈ (∆f (2) , +∞). (In Lemma A.1, we show that 365 max{∆f (1) , 0} ≤ max{∆f (2) , 0}, so this characterization makes sense. In the same lemma, we also
366
show that the relative size of γ (1) , γ (2) , and γ (3) depend on the magnitude of ∆f .)
367
Building upon the results in Section 4, we characterize the SPNE of the game. 
where 373 π
Note that both providers always purchase from the GPO in equilibrium. This result generalizes 374 to n > 2 providers with identical purchasing requirements ( §6). However, this result does not apply 375 in general. The price p G that the GPO charges is the breakeven price for the large provider. The 376 small provider benefits from the magnitude of the large provider's purchasing requirement: the total 377 purchasing cost π 1 of the small provider decreases as the large provider's purchasing requirement q 2 378 increases. However, the large provider's total purchasing cost π 2 does not depend on the smaller 379 provider's purchasing requirement q 1 .
380
Also we see that the GPO's profit π G is strictly positive when the contracting efficiency is 381 moderate or high. When its contracting efficiency is low, the manufacturer collects all the payments 382 from providers, and the GPO just breaks even (i.e., π M = π 1 +π 2 and π G = 0). When the contracting 383 efficiency is moderate or high, the GPO is no longer a profitless intermediary, and the payments 384 from the providers are split between the manufacturer and the GPO (i.e., π M + π G = π 1 + π 2 and 385 π G ≥ 0).
386
The GPO membership fee affects the players in different ways. For all levels of contracting 387 efficiency, we observe the following for a given value of the total fixed contracting cost f G . As the
388
GPO membership feef G increases, the GPO's profit π G and the manufacturer's profit π M stay the 389 same or increase. However, the providers' total purchasing costs π 1 and π 2 are not affected: the 390 providers' total fixed contracting cost f G remains the same, and a change in the membership fee 391 only changes how much of f G gets transferred to the GPO.
392
Interestingly, the manufacturer's effective unit price for the small provider p * − γq 1 and the 393 large provider p * − γq 2 is greater than the competitive source's unit pricep. In particular, the 394 proof of Theorem 5.1 indicates that the manufacturer's discount rate γ at equilibrium does not 395 exceed (p * −p)/q 2 and (p * −p)/q 1 . Despite this, the manufacturer still "gets the business" of the 396 providers because of the GPO's contracting efficiency and aggregating abilities. Also, note that 397 when the GPO's contracting efficiency is "high", the manufacturer's optimal strategy is to set a 398 zero discount rate. In this regime, the GPO's contracting efficiency is so large that both providers will purchase through the GPO, regardless of the manufacturer's quantity-discount schedule, and so 400 the manufacturer optimizes by not offering a discount at all.
401
Next, we more closely examine the behavior of the equilibria described in Theorem 5.1 with 402 respect to the contracting administration fee λ and the contracting efficiency ∆f . To facilitate the 403 analysis, we define the following regions in (λ, ∆f )-space: and ∆f are:
In addition, in order to examine how the manufacturer and the GPO share the revenue coming from 408 the providers, we define the profit share of the GPO as
In the following corollary, we examine how these quantities behave as functions of the contracting 410 efficiency, ∆f , and the CAF, λ. Recall that the providers' total fixed contracting cost f G consists 411 off G , the GPO membership fee, andf G , the providers' fixed contracting cost when purchasing 412 through the GPO. With f M andf G fixed, an increase in the contracting efficiency ∆f
414
Corollary 5.2. Suppose f M andf G are fixed. Then: Figure 2 : Characterization of the SPNE described in Theorem 5.1 in (λ, ∆f )-space. total purchasing cost decreases, while the large provider's total purchasing cost stays the same.
418
In addition, as the contracting efficiency increases, the profit of the GPO and the manufacturer 419 increases. Therefore, an increase in contracting efficiency benefits all channel members. We expect schedule, and as a result, is able to "capture" some of the GPO's contracting efficiency.
425
Next, consider the behavior of the equilibrium payoffs as the CAF varies. According to
426
Corollary 5.2, neither provider's total purchasing cost is affected by the CAF; the CAF only affects 427 the profits of the GPO and the manufacturer. As the CAF increases, the GPO's profit increases,
428
while the manufacturer's profit decreases. However, their total profits remain unchanged because 429 the providers' total costs are invariant to the CAFs. The higher the CAF, the more profitable the 430 GPO. Finally, as both the contracting efficiency and the CAF increase, the GPO captures a larger 431 fraction of the revenue collected from the providers.
432
The top row of plots in Figure 5 The presence of a GPO affects the total purchasing cost of the providers in different ways. These 466 differences are partly driven by the mechanisms that the manufacturer and the GPO use to price 467 the product. Lemma 4.2 tells us that when it is optimal for the large provider to purchase through 468 the GPO, it is optimal for the smaller provider as well. The opposite holds for purchasing from the 469 manufacturer.
470
Comparing the equilibrium total purchasing costs of the providers with and without the presence 471 of the GPO, we obtain the following corollary.
472
Corollary 5.4. (a) π
2 .
473
We see that the small provider benefits from the presence of the GPO: its total purchasing cost in 474 the presence of a GPO is always strictly less than its total purchasing cost in the absence of a GPO.
475
However, the large provider benefits from the absence of a GPO: its total purchasing cost in the 476 absence of a GPO is no greater than that in the presence of a GPO. Moreover, when there is "low" 477 competition, its total purchasing cost in the absence of a GPO is strictly less. This occurs since in 478 the absence of a GPO, the large provider benefits when the manufacturer sets a higher discount 479 rate in order to attract the small provider.
480
As discussed above, the providers face a higher unit price in the presence of a GPO. In the 481 absence of a GPO, the effective unit price to the providers isp, while in the presence of a GPO, the effective unit price to the providers isp + ∆f /q i . However, this difference is offset by the lower 483 contracting costs in the presence of a GPO. This result is consistent with the findings of a pilot 484 study described in §2: that GPO prices were not always lower but often higher than prices paid 485 by providers that negotiated directly with vendors. These GAO findings are used as criticisms of
486
GPOs. However, as shown in our model, this result is consistent with providers seeking the lowest 487 total purchasing cost but not necessarily the lowest unit cost.
488
In the absence of a GPO, the manufacturer may not be able to attract the business of both 489 providers, while in the presence of a GPO, the manufacturer gets the business of both providers 490 through the GPO. This occurs when competition is sufficiently high; that is, when the base unit 491 price p * and the competitive source's unit pricep are so far apart that the manufacturer is unable
492
to set a sufficiently high discount rate to compete with the competitive source.
493
6 The case of n identical providers and linear quantity discount
494
We now focus on the case with n identical providers, i.e, q 1 = · · · = q n = q and a linear quantity-495 discount schedule. By symmetry, all n providers have the same equilibrium strategy and associated 496 payoff. We denote this strategy simply by s i and the associated payoff π i .
497
First, we consider the equilibrium behavior in the game with a GPO. Define
In this case, we say that the GPO's contracting efficiency is "low" if ∆f ∈ [0, ∆f (3) ], and "high" if 499 ∆f ∈ (∆f (3) , +∞). Intuitively, at equilibrium, the manufacturer and the GPO set prices to extract 500 as much profit as possible from the providers, since the providers are identical. This reasoning 501 results in the following theorem.
502
Theorem 6.1 (Characterization of SPNE, identical providers, with a GPO). Given different levels 503 of contracting efficiency, the following strategy profiles are SPNE, with their associated payoffs:
504 strategies payoffs contracting efficiency Figure 3 : Characterization of the SPNE described in Theorem 6.1 in (λ, ∆f )-space.
where
The managerial interpretations for the equilibrium behavior in the case of two heterogeneous 507 providers discussed in §5.1 hold in this case of n identical providers as well.
508
As before, we define regions of "low" and "high" contracting efficiency in (λ, ∆f )-space: providers' costs, the GPO's profit, and the manufacturer's profit at equilibrium as functions of λ 511 and ∆f are:
We also look at the GPO's profit share ρ G as a function of λ and ∆f .
513
Corollary 6.2. Suppose f M andf G are fixed. Then: of Figure 6 with that of Figure 5 , we see that the results are quite similar.
520
Now we turn to equilibrium behavior in the game without a GPO. Using Lemma 4.4, we have 521 the following characterization of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
522
Theorem 6.3 (Characterization of SPNE, identical providers, without a GPO). The strategy profile
is an SPNE, with associated payoffs π i = qp + f M and π M = nqp.
524
As in the case of two heterogeneous providers, the equilibria described in Theorem 6.3 are 525 largely driven by the usual trade-off between price and volume. Like the case of two heterogeneous 526 providers, the providers face a higher unit price in the presence of a GPO, which is offset by the 527 lower contracting costs in the presence of a GPO.
528
7 Returning to more general cases
529
In this section, we identify equilibrium behaviors from §5 and §6 that appear to extend to more 530 general cases: n providers with arbitrary fixed purchasing requirements and a manufacturer's 531 quantity-discount schedule that is nonlinear. Given that all of the providers buy through the GPO in the two special cases examined above (both 535 with a linear quantity-discount schedule), we decided to examine the scenario with n heterogeneous 536 providers and a linear quantity-discount schedule, partly to see if the "all-providers-buy-through-537 the-GPO" result was an artifact of our model, but more importantly, to see if other characteristics 538 of the equilibria in these special cases continued to apply in this more general scenario. Although we are unable to obtain closed-form expressions for equilibrium strategies and payoffs 540 in this case, we computed them for a variety of parameterizations, using the procedure described 541 in §4. We discretized the space of linear quantity-discount schedules p(q) = p * − γq by restricting purchase their requirements through the GPO in equilibrium, just like in the identical-provider case.
551
In addition, the influence of λ and ∆f on GPO and manufacturer profit, and GPO profit share 552 in this "almost-identical provider" case are the same as those in the identical-provider case. For 553 example, in both cases, the GPO's profit is nondecreasing in λ and ∆f , while the manufacturer's 554 profit is nonincreasing in λ and nondecreasing in ∆f .
555
On the other hand, a large variance in the providers' purchasing requirements provides the GPO the opportunity to maximize its profit by setting its price so that it attracts only the smallest relatively higher profits to the GPO and relatively much lower profits to the manufacturer.
565
These observations are intuitive. When the providers are relatively homogeneous, they each 566 benefit similarly from the aggregation ability of the GPO. In addition, the homogeneity of the 567 purchasing requirements diminishes the effect of GPO's tradeoff between its unit on-contract price 568 and volume. However, when the providers are relatively heterogeneous, they benefit differently from 569 the aggregating ability of the GPO. Also, when the GPO's contracting efficiency is high, the GPO 570 is in a position to attract virtually any provider that it chooses to. Hence, its profit-maximizing 571 price does not necessarily attract the largest providers.
572
The following theorem provides sufficient conditions for this observed behavior in the general case: 573 n providers with arbitrary purchasing requirements and a generic manufacturer's quanitty-discount 574 schedule p(·) such that p(q) is nonincreasing in q and the associated revenue p(q)q is nondecreasing 575 in q.
576
Theorem 7.1. Suppose n ≥ 3. In addition, suppose there exists a constant M independent of 577 ∆f such that for any p(·) that is feasible for the manufacturer, 0 ≤ p(q) ≤ M for all q ≥ 0. Let
then for sufficiently high ∆f , there exist providers that do not purchase through the GPO in 580 equilibrium.
581
In particular, Theorem 7.1 holds when the manufacturer's quantity-discount schedule is linear-582 that is, of the form (5.1). In this case, since the manufacturer's choice of discount rate γ is 583 constrained between 0 and γ max = p * /(2 n i=1 q i ), the unit price p(q) is bounded, independent of 584 ∆f . Note also that (7.1) can never hold when n = 2 or with n identical providers.
585
In summary, in the limited number of instances we observed, the qualitative results for scenarios 586 with 2 heterogeneous providers ( §5) and n identical providers ( §6) appear to apply to scenarios 587 with n similar, but heterogeneous providers. When there are many providers with highly varying 588 purchasing requirements, all providers no longer necessarily purchase through the GPO. In §5 and §6, we studied games where the manufacturer announces a linear quantity-discount schedule 
602
Although we are unable to obtain a closed-form characterization of the equilibrium strategies 603 and payoffs when the quantity-discount schedule is of the form (7.2), the equilibria can be computed 604 numerically, using the procedure described in §4. For these computations, we fixed the value of η,
605
and discretized the space of nonlinear quantity-discount schedules by restricting the domain of γ.
606
When η > 0, we restricted the domain of γ to 1,000 uniformly spaced values in [0, 1]. When η < 0,
607
we computed the value of γ min (described above), and restricted the domain of γ to 1,000 uniformly of the quantity-discount schedules used in these examples.
621
Note that the quantity-discount schedules used in these examples are similar, especially in 
Concluding remarks
640
In this section, we answer the five questions posed in the introduction, adding a few suggestions for 641 future research. Before doing so, we acknowledge that our model, and, hence, our results is/are 642 limited to a scenario in which provider demand is inelastic (i.e., fixed provider requirements). Our 643 model is also limited to a single product, whereas GPO pricing sometimes involves bundles of 644 products. These extensions are worthy of future research. We will comment on the impact of other 645 model assumptions below.
646
Do providers experience lower prices or lower total purchasing costs with a GPO in the supply 647 chain? Based on Lemma 4.2, in the general case, the GPO will set its price to be equal to the 648 breakeven price-the price that equalizes the total purchasing cost-of the largest provider that 649 it chooses to contract for (i.e., at the price that will maximize the GPO's profit). Providers with 650 smaller purchasing requirements will experience lower total purchasing costs in the presence of a
651
GPO, but may experience higher per-unit prices.
652
These answers must be carefully interpreted when provider-members share in GPO profits. Our 653 model could be modified to account for this by including such profit-sharing in each provider's 654 total purchasing costs, and therefore each provider's breakeven price. This, and the fact that large 655 providers are more likely to be GPO owners, would increase the likelihood that larger providers will 656 purchase through the GPO. This is a topic worthy of future research. Large providers may also 657 demand that the GPO share its CAF. In effect, this would decrease such providers' per unit cost 658 and increase the likelihood of their purchases through the GPO. This, too, deserves more study.
659
Do CAFs mean higher prices paid by providers? In the two special cases examined, the total 660 purchasing cost of the providers is not affected by the CAF, although providers may experience higher unit prices. Based on computational experiments, it seems that this behavior occurs in more A Proofs let π M (γ) denote the manufacturer's revenue as a function of its discount rate γ. quantities from all of its three options. In particular, suppose provider i purchases β G q i through 736 the GPO, β M q i from the manufacturer, and (1 − β G − β M )q i from the competitive source, for some
The first inequality holds since
is clear that for fixed values of p G and γ, it is optimal for provider i to purchase its entire requirement 740 from the option that offers the lowest total cost. The lemma follows from this observation.
741
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Recall that we assume q 1 ≤ · · · ≤ q n without loss of generality. Suppose p G is 742 an optimal strategy for the GPO, such that p G ≤ min{p(q k ),p} + ∆f q k for some k that satisfies q k < q j 743 for all j = k + 1, . . . , n. Then, by Lemma 4.1, providers 1, . . . , k purchase their entire requirement 744 through the GPO, and the GPO's profit is kf
is optimal, it must be that p G = min{p(q k ),p} + Before we begin, we show some properties of ∆f (1) , ∆f (2) , γ (0) , γ (1) , and γ (2) , where
Proof. First, we show part a. Let
Note that ∆f (1) ≥ 0 when λ ≤ λ (1) , and ∆f (2) ≥ 0 when λ ≤ λ (2) . We have that λ (2) ≥ λ (1) , since
Therefore, for all λ ∈ [λ (1) , 1], the claim holds. Note that
for any λ ∈ [0, λ (1) ], the claim also holds.
760
Now, we show part b. Since ∆f ≤ ∆f (1) , we have that
Part c follows in a similar manner.
762
Next, we show part d.
Above, inequality (i) holds since ∆f ≤ ∆f (1) , and inequality (ii) holds since λ ≤ λ (1) .
Part e holds, since ∆f ≤ ∆f (2) implies
Finally, parts f and g hold, since
Lemma A.2. Let γ be any given strategy for the manufacturer. a. Given "low" contracting efficiency; i.e., ∆f ≤ ∆f (1) : the optimal strategies of the providers 768 and the GPO are:
b. Given "moderate" contracting efficiency; i.e., ∆f (1) < ∆f ≤ ∆f (2) : the optimal strategies of 771 the providers and the GPO are:
c. Given "high" contracting efficiency; i.e., ∆f > ∆f (2) : the optimal strategies of the providers 775 and the GPO are
Proof. First, note that since q 1 < q 2 and ∆f > 0, we have that for any given γ ≥ 0,p + 
It is straightforward to show that: π G (p + Suppose 0 ≤ ∆f ≤ f (1) . By Lemma A.1.ace, then the GPO's optimal strategy p G is: +∞ if
]. Suppose ∆f (1) < ∆f ≤ ∆f (2) . Then, by Lemma A.1.bf, 787 the GPO's optimal strategy p G is: 
Since γ ∈ [0, γ max ], the expression q(p * − γq) is increasing in q. Also note thatp < p * − γq 1 . It
). 
It is clear that
) > π G (+∞), and so the GPO's optimal strategy is p G = p * − γq 2 + ∆f q 2 .
806
A-4
Putting the three cases together implies the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We first consider the case of "low" contracting efficiency. Suppose ∆f ≤ 808 ∆f (1) . By Lemma A.2, the manufacturer's revenue π M (γ) as a function of γ is: 0 if γ ∈ [0, γ (1) );
Note that π M (γ) is nonincreasing in γ on every 810 interval, and therefore the manufacturer's optimal discount rate must be attained at the left endpoint 811 of one of these intervals: that is, it must be either 0 or γ (1) . Since
it follows that the strategy profile s 1 = GPO, s 2 = GPO, p G =p + ∆f /q 2 , γ = γ (1) is an SPNE.
813
Next, we consider the case of "moderate" contracting efficiency. Suppose ∆f ∈ (∆f (1) , ∆f (2) ].
814
By Lemma A.2, the manufacturer's revenue π M (γ) as a function of γ is: 0 if γ ∈ [0, max{0, γ (0) });
Again, note that π M (γ) is nonincreasing in γ on every interval, and therefore the manufacturer's 817 optimal discount rate must be attained at either 0, max{0, γ (0) }, or γ (1) . We have that
where inequality (i) holds because ∆f < q 1 ((1 − λ)p * −p) −f G , and inequality (ii) holds because
, and so the strategy profile s 1 = GPO,
is an SPNE.
822
Now suppose γ (0) ≤ 0; that is, ∆f ≥ q 1 ((1 − λ)p * −p) −f G . Then, we have that
and so the strategy profile s 1 = GPO, s 2 = GPO, p G =p + ∆f /q 2 , γ = γ (2) is an SPNE.
824
Finally, suppose ∆f > ∆f (2) . By Lemma A.2, the manufacturer's revenue as a function of
Therefore, in this case, the 826 manufacturer's optimal discount rate is 0, and so the strategy profile s 1 = GPO, s 2 = GPO, 827 p G =p + ∆f /q 2 , γ = 0 is an SPNE.
828
Proof of Corollary 5.2. This follows by taking partial derivatives with respect to λ and ∆f , and 829 comparing the partial derivatives for (λ, ∆f ) in Ξ L , Ξ M , and Ξ H .
830
Proof of Theorem 5.3. By Lemma 4.4, the manufacturer's revenue π M (γ) as a function of γ is: 0
Therefore, the manufacturer's optimal discount rate must be attained at either 0,
833
In this case, we have that ) > π M (0), and so the strategy profile s 1 = comp, s 2 = mfr, 838 γ = (p * −p)/q 2 is an SPNE.
839
Next, we consider the case of "low" competition. Supposep (1) First, we show some properties of γ (3) and ∆f (3) .
844
Lemma A.3. Next, we characterize the optimal strategies of the providers and the GPO as a function of the 848 manufacturer's discount rate γ.
849
Lemma A.4. Let γ be any given strategy for the manufacturer. Proof. We consider two cases, based on the level of γ. and therefore the manufacturer's optimal discount rate must be attained at the left endpoint of one 875 of these intervals: that is, it must be either 0 or γ (3) . Since π M (γ (3) ) = (1 − λ)(nq)(p * − γ (3) nq) = 876 nq + nf G + n∆f > 0 = π M (0), it follows that the strategy profile s i = GPO, p G =p + ∆f /q, 877 γ = γ (3) is an SPNE.
878
Next, we consider part b. By Lemma A.4, the manufacturer's revenue as a function of γ is 879 π M (γ) = (1 − λ)nqp * , and so in this case, the manufacturer's optimal discount rate is 0. Therefore, 880 the strategy profile s i = GPO, p G =p + ∆f /q, γ = 0 is an SPNE.
881
Proof of Corollary 6.2. This follows by taking partial derivatives with respect to λ and ∆f , and 
So, if ∆f is sufficiently high, by (7.1), we have that π G (p B n ) < π G (p B k * ) for any feasible p(·), since
